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MODERN LIMITATIONS UPON THE INFANT'S POWER TO DISAFFIRM HIS
CONTRACTS--For centuries infants have been deemed so incapable of conducting
their own business affairs that our courts have considered it necessary to protect
them not only from those who might take advantage of their inexperience, but
also from the consequences of their own rash and ill-advised acts. In accord-
ance with this policy of the law, infants were given the power to disaffirm their
contracts under certain conditions, and permitted to recover any consideration
they had paid, regardless of the innocence and good faith of the other party to
the transaction. In recent years, however, the courts have shown a marked
tendency away from this policy, and have inclined toward holding the infant to
a stricter accountability, with the result that the conflict between the new and
the old ideas has given rise to great confusion in modem law.
It is said that at common law the contracts of an infant were divided into
three classes: void, when they were clearly prejudicial to the infant; voidable,
when possibly beneficial to him; and valid when clearly in his best interests.'
Inaccurate as it is, this classification has left so great an impression on the law
of today that it merits examination.
Few statements have been based so much on authority and so little on
reason as that which lays down the precept that certain contracts of an infant
are void because clearly prejudicial to his interests. In many of the early cases,
it happened that the infant was the party defendant, and the courts, in their zeal
to extend to him the shield of the law, said that the contract was void when in
reality there was no necessity for so doing, and the infant's rights would have
been adequately protected by giving him the right of disaffirmance. This misuse
of terms led courts in later times to crystallize the error into a rule of law."
Another line of cases may be traced to a statement by Perkins that all gifts,
grants, or deeds made by an infant which do not take effect by delivery of his
own hand are void, but that those which take effect by delivery of his own hand
are merely voidable.3 No authority is given for this rule, and it is doubtful if
there ever was any, but therecan be no doubt that it is the basis of the decisions
holding that an infant's power of attorney,4 his power of attorney to confess
judgment,5 his contract to arbitrate,6 and even his appointment of any agent at
all are void.' It seems obvious that in all these cases the infant's power of
disaffirmance affords him ample protection, and there is no necessity for holding
any contract wholly void. The better rule today recognizes this fact, and treats
all the contracts of an infant, including his appointment of an agent," as merely
voidable 9 unless there is an express statutory provision to the contrary.10
' See Harvey v. Ashley, 3 Atk. 6o7 (Eng. 1748) ; I WiLnisoN, CONTRACrS (2d ed. i9_4)
§223.2 PoIZ.oc, CONTRACTS (gth ed. 1921) 6o.
PERKINS, PROFITABLE Boox (I5th ed. 1827) § 12.
Philpot v. Bingham, 55 Ala. 435 (1876).
Knox v. Flack, 22 Pa. 337 (1853).
"Millsaps v. Estes, 134 N. C. 486, 46 S. E. 988 (igo).7 Trueblood v. Trueblood, 8 Ind. 195 (1856) ; Covault v. Nevitt, 157 Wis. 113, 146 N. W.
III! (1914).
Where the infant is a principal, and disaffirms a contract made on his behalf by an
agent, the better rule is that the agent is not liable to the third party for breach of warranty,
since he has merely warranted that he had authority to contract, and this is not affected by
the subsequent disaffirmance. Patterson v. Lippincott, 47 N. J. L. 457 (1885). If the agent
conceals the fact that his principal is an infant, or does not disclose that he has a principal,
the ordinary rules governing undisclosed and partially disclosed principals should apply.
This point is further discussed in Note (1924) 24 Col. L. REv. 6o.
'POLLOCK, op. cit. supra note 2, at 59 et seq.; I Wl..usTox, op. cit. supra note I, § 27.
"In England all contracts with infants for the repayment of money lent or for goods
supplied other than necessaries are absolutely void. Infants' Relief Act, 37 & 38 VIcr. c. 62,
(731)
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There are many statements to the effect that certain contracts of an infant
are valid and may be enforced against him. Among these is his executed con-
tract of marriage, but is it not apparent that in such case the infant is not being
held to any contractual obligation, but is required to answer for the performance
of obligations imposed by law upon all those who have assumed a certain status,
regardless of considerations of age? 1 Similarly, in cases where the infant
promises to perform that which is a legal duty incumbent upon him,12 or enters
into any contract the performance of which is regulated by statute,13 he is held,
not upon his promise, but because the law requires performance of such duties,
irrespective of the promise, from all who have assumed certain obligations. Many
courts and text writers have said that the infant's contract for necessaries is
valid, but it is clear that his liability is not predicated upon his express promise
nor defined by the terms of the contract. 14 In the words of the Massachusetts
court: 1-
"[The infant] . . . is held on a promise implied by law, and not,
strictly speaking, on his actual promise. The law implies the promise to
pay from the necessity of his situation. . .. In other words, he is liable
to pay only what the necessaries were reasonably worth, and not what he
may improvidently have agreed to pay for them."
It is apparent, therefore, that the infant's liability when he purchases necessaries
is quasi-contractual, and that he retains his power to rescind the express con-
tract. In the other instances he is held because his express promise has created
a situation out of which certain legal consequences arise.
It may be said that the great majority of the infant's contracts are voidable.
In the past he has been able to use this power of disaffirmance as he chose,
regardless of the resulting injustice and hardship to innocent adults. But in
recent years the courts have set about curtailing this power, and with the aid of
statutes in many jurisdictions, have succeeded in removing much of his former
immunity.
In Minnesota ' 6 and New Hampshire this has been done by the application
of the so-called "provident" rule, which is nothing more than an extension of
the rule holding the infant liable for necessaries to include any contract from
§ i (1874). In California, "A minor cannot give a delegation of power, nor, under the age of
eighteen, make a contract relating to real property, or any interest therein, or relating to
any personal property not in his immediate possession or control." CAL. Civ. CODE (Deering,
193') § 33. Under this provision a contract relating to real property is entirely void. Lee
v. Hibernia Savings & Loan Ass'n, 177 Cal. 656, 17I Pac. 677 (i918). Similar clauses are
to be found in S. D. ComP. LAws (1929) § 81; N. D. ComP. LAws ANN. (1913) § 4338.
"Parton v. Hervey, 67 Mass. 11 (I-55) ; 3 PAGE, CONTRAcTS (2d ed. x2o) § 1582; 2
SCHOULER, MARRIAGE, DrvORCE, SEPARATION AxD DomasTIc RE.ATrIONs (6th ed. 1921)
§ lo73. It is well settled that an infant is not liable for breach of his executory contract of
marriage. Hunt v. Peake, 5 Cow. 475 (N. Y. 1826) ; Warwick v. Cooper, 37 Tenn. 659
(1858).
Hlawaty v. Zeock, 253 Pa. 31H, 98 Atl. 557 (1916) (where the infant was charged with
a trust); i Wn~ SToN, op. cit. supra note r, § 228. Analogous to this is the situation wherein
the infant partner is prevented from claiming, as against creditors, the amount of his con-
tribution to the partnership assets, although he can avoid liability greater than the amount
of his contribution. Note (1927) 4o HARv. L. REv. 472; I WmLisToN, op. cit. supra note I,
"Thus when an infant enlists in the army he has no power to disaffirm the contract) of
enlistment. "It is not a contract only, but effects a change of status." In re Morrisey, 137
U. S. 157, 159, 1I Sup. Ct. 57 (I89O).
" Askey v. Williams, 74 Tex. 294, ii S. W. xiOi (1889) ; Plummer v. Northern Pac. Ry.
Co., 98 Wash. 67, 167 Pac. 73 (1917); UNIFORm SALEs Acr, § 2. Cf. Roberts v. Gray,
[1913] I K. B. .2o.
"Trainer v. Trumbull, 141 Mass. 527, 53o, 6 N. E. 761, 762 (1886).
'Berglund v. American Multigraph Sales Co., 135 Minn. 67, 16o N. W. 191 (1i16).
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which the infant has received benefit. It is best expounded by the New
Hampshire court itself: 17
"The right to recover for necessaries is given, because the infant has
derived a benefit therefrom. It is upon no other ground. If the benefit is
the foundation of the right, why should it be limited to necessaries? It
cannot be said that the infant, if engaged in trade or business, may not
derive a benefit therefrom. If benefit obtained by the infant is the test in
one case, why not make it the test in all cases? The true rule is, that the
contract of an infant or lunatic, whether executed or executory, cannot be
rescinded or avoided without restoring to the other party the consideration
received, or allowing him to recover compensation for all the benefit con-
ferred upon the party seeking to avoid the contract . . . the plea of
infancy is not a bar to the plaintiff's recovery."
This ingenious solution has much to commend it. There can be no doubt
that it will usually achieve substantial justice between the parties, and further,
it neatly disposes of one question which continues to trouble other courts; the
restoration by the infant of the consideration he has received as a condition
precedent to his disaffirmance. It will be observed that the "provident" rule is
not altogether consistent with that governing the infant's contracts for neces-
saries, inasmuch as the criterion is not the reasonable value of the goods re-
ceived, but the benefit actually derived by the infant from the transaction. 8 He
is, therefore, held accountable for the benefit he has received, and the restora-
tion of this benefit or its equivalent is a condition precedent to his exercise of
his power of disaffirmance.
No other courts have attacked the problem by this method. The general
rule undoubtedly is that the infant need restore only so much of the considera-
tion as remains in his possession, and if he has used or dissipated all of it his
right of disaffirmance is unimpaired.'" Accordingly, where an infant receives
goods under a contract and uses them, and thereafter endeavors to return them
to the vendor and disaffirm the contract, many courts refuse to allow the vendor
any set-off for depreciation, and permit the infant to recover the entire purchase
price.2 0 To quote the Maine court in Utterstront v. Kidder: 2 '
"Depreciation in the value of the Reo truck, due to plaintiff's misuse
or neglect, is the result of the very improvidence and indiscretion of infancy
which the law has always in mind, and which he who deals with infancy
must anticipate. To require the minor to restore the value of such deprecia-
tion as a prerequisite to his disaffirmance of the contract and recovery of
his payments would be to deprive him of the protection which it is the
policy of the law to afford him."
I Hall v. Butterfield, 59 N. H. 354, 359 (1879). See Whitman v. Allen, 123 Me. i, 6,
i21 AtI. i6o, 163 (1923); I WlL.ISTON, op. cit. supra note I, § 238.
'Berglund v. American Multigraph Sales Co., supra note 16, at 7i, 16o N. W. at 193:
"Plaintiff was obliged to account for the benefits received from the use of the goods. This
would be the benefits received by him, not necessarily the market value of such use or the
rental value of the goods." See also Stack v. Cavanaugh, 67 N. H. 149, 3o Atl. 350 (i89);
Woolridge v. Lavoie, 79 N. H. 21, 1O4 Atl. 346 (1918).
"Shutter v. Fudge, io8 Conn. 528, 143 Atl. 896 (1928), (i929) 77 U. oF PA. L. REv.
8I ; Wuller v. Chuse Grocery Co., 241 Ill. 398, 89 N. E. 796 (i9o9) ; Gray v. Grimm, 157
Ky. 6o3, 163 S. W. 762 (1914); Heght v. Harris, 188 N. C. 328, 124 S. E. 623 (1924);
Carpenter v. McGuckian, 43 R. I. 94, i1O Atl. 402 (I92o), (1921) 34 HAav. L. REV. 436.
'Arkansas Reo Motor Co. v. Goodlett, 163 Ark. 35, 258 S. W. 975 (924) ; Gillis v.
Goodwin, i8o Mass. 140, 61 N. E. 813 (i9Ol); Reynolds v. Garber-Buick Co., 183 Mich.
157, 149 N. W. 985 (1914).
= 124 Me. 10, 13, 124 Atl. 725, 726 (1924). Cf. Whitman v. Allen, supra note 17.
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Statements such as this are to be found in the opinions of courts which as
yet are not convinced that public policy requires a change in the protection
accorded infants. Other courts, aided in many instances by statutes, have held
that restoration is a condition precedent to disaffirmance, 22 and that the infant
must account for the use of the property,2 3 and in one case the vendor's right of
set-off has been enforced so far as to allow him an affirmative recovery against
the infant.24
The most perplexing problems arise where the infant has induced the other
party to contract with him by falsely representing himself to be of age. Under
a strict application of the "provident" rule this would make no difference, the
only question involved being that of benefit to the infant .2  There is a clear
split of authority, however, among the other jurisdictions. The majority, cling-
ing firmly to precedent, hold that the infant's false representations will not
estop him from exercising his right of disaffirmance, either at law or in equity, 2'
and seem to feel that the injured party can secure sufficient redress by an action
on the case for deceit.27  The infant, of course, is liable for his torts unless the
tort arises from a contract, and in a case of misrepresentation, the tort is
antecedent to the contract. A growing minority of jurisdictions is firmly con-
vinced that public policy has changed, and holds that the infant who misrepre-
sents his age is estopped to set up his infancy as a defense, especially when the
suit is in equity.
2 -
The United States Supreme Court was faced with this problem in what*
bids fair to become the leading case, Myers v. Hurley Motor Co.,21' where an
infant represented himself to be of age and purchased an automobile on a con-
ditional sale contract. He paid $4o6.12 in installments and then defaulted,
2Murdock v. Fisher Finance Corp., 79 Cal. App. 787, 251 Pac. 319 (1926), decided
under CA. Civ. CODE (Deering, ig3i) § 35; Stanhope v. Shambow et al., 54 Mont. 36o,
i7o Pac. 752 (I918), decided under MONT. REv. CODE (Choate, ig2i) §568o. Contra:
Leacox v. Griffith, 76 Iowa 89, 40 N. W. lO9 (i888), decided under IOwA CODE (1927)
§ 10493.
21 The increasing use of the advantages of the conditional sale contract is causing more
and more courts to hold the infant liable for depreciation. Berglund v. American Multi-
graph Sales Co., supra note 16, (the "provident" rule) ; Rice v. Butler, 16o N. Y. 578, 55
N. E. 275 (I899) ; Pettit v. Liston, 97 Ore. 464, 191 Pac. 66a (i92o).2 Toon v. Mack Truck Co., 87 Cal. App. 151, 262 Pac- 51 (1927).
Only last year, however, the Minnesota court held that the "provident" rule had no
application in a case of misrepresentation, and followed the rule laid down by the Supreme
Court in Myers v. Hurley, infra note 29. Steigerwalt v. Woodhead Co. et al., 244 N. W.
412 (Minn. 1932).
' At law: International Text-Book Co. v. Connelly, 2o6 N. Y. I88, 99 N. E. 722 (1912);
Wisconsin Loan & Finance Corp. v. Goodnough, 2oi Wis. ioi, 228 N. W. 484 (1930);
Note (1926) 24 MicHi. L. REv. 391. In equity: Sims v. Everhardt, 1O2 U. S. 3o0 (1880);
Tobin v. Spann, 85 Ark. 556, 091 S. W. 534 (19o8); Carolina Investment B. & L. Ass'n v.
Black, iig N. C. 323, 25 S. E. 975 (I896).
2 7Fitts v. Hall, 9 N. H. 441 (1838) ; Neff v. Landis, no Pa. 2o4, i At. I77 (1885);
Wisconsin Loan & Finance Corp. v. Goodnough, supra note 26. But where the cause of
action proceeds on the theory that a contract exists there can be no recovery. Nash v.
Jewett, 61 Vt. 50, (1889) ; Covault v. Nevitt, supra note 7. Where the substance of the
action is in tort it cannot be defeated by a plea of infancy merely because the injured party
waives the tort and sues in assumpsit. Elwell v. Martin, 32 Vt. 217 (2859).
" A few courts have been courageous enough to raise an estoppel against the infant in
an action at law. Hood v. Duren, 33 Ga. App. 2o3, 125 S. E. 787 (1924), (I925) 25 COL.
L. Rxv. 840; Young v. Daniel, 2oi Ky. 65, 255 S. W. 854 (1923), (1924) 72 U. OF Px L.
REv. 45o; La Rosa v. Nichols, 92 N. J. L. 375, io5 Atl. 2oi (i918), Note (Q919) 3 MiNN.
L. REv. 273; Klinck v. Reeder, 1O7 Neb. 342, 85 Ni. W. OOO (1921). In equity the problem
is simpler. See Looney v. Elkhorn Land Co., 195 Ky. 198, 242 S. W. 27 (1922); Commander
v. Brazil, 88 Miss. 668, 41 So. 497 (i9o6). But the mere fact that the infant appears to be
of age is not enough to raise an estoppel; there must be some affirmative action on his part
tending to deceive the other party. Friar v. Rae-Chandler Co., I92 Iowa 427, 185 N. W.
32 (1921).
29273 U. S. 18, 47 Sup. Ct. 277 (1927).
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whereupon the vendor repossessed itself of the car. Thereafter the infant sued
to recover the money he had paid, and the vendor set up as a counter-claim the
sum of $525.96, representing depreciation during the time the car was in the
infant's possession. The lower court gave judgment for the defendant for the
full amount of the counter-claim, but the Supreme Court reversed this, and
while refusing to allow an affirmative recovery against the infant, held that he
could not recover when the amount of the counter-claim was equal to or in
excess of his demand. Although this was an action at law, the Court based its
decision on equitable principles, and in the course of its opinion said: 30
"How far the equitable maxim, that he who seeks equity must do
equity, applies generally in suits brought for relief because of infancy, we
need not enquire; nor do we need here to go as far as the authorities just
cited. The maxim applies, at least, where there has been, as there was here,
actual fraud on the part of the infant. When an infant of mature appear-
ance, by false and fraudulent representations as to his age, has induced
another person to sell and deliver property to him, it is against natural jus-
tice to permit the infant to recover money paid for the property without
first compelling him to account for the injury which his deceit has inflicted
upon the other person.
"Our conclusion that the affirmative defense is available in this action
does not rest upon the doctrine of estoppel, though the result may be the
same. It recognizes the plaintiff's right to repudiate his promise and sue
for the return of his payments, and his immunity from a plea of estoppel
in so doing. Its effect is not to enforce the disaffirmed contract directly
or indirectly, but to allow him to invoke the aid of the court to enforce an
equitable remedy arising from the disaffirmance only upon condition that
'seeking equity, he must do equity.'"
The Court carefully limited its holding to the facts of the particular case,
and sought to avoid overruling its previous decisions that an estoppel in pais
was not applicable to infants,"' but it barely succeeded, if at all. The decision
represents a great step forward along the lines indicated by modern public
policy, and has been widely approved and followed.2
It is observed, therefore, that on the two important questions of restoration
and the effect of misrepresentation there is wide divergence among our courts.
As to the first, we find courts which require restoration as a condition precedent
to the infant's exercise of his power of disaffirmance, while other courts say
that he need restore only so much of the consideration as he has in his possession
at the time of disaffirmance. Somewhere between these two extremes lies the
"provident" rule, which requires the infant to account only for benefits actually
C Id. at 26, 47 Sup. Ct. at 279.
Sims v. Everhardt, supra note 26. But the decision in Myers v. Hurley was fore-
shadowed by the action of the Supreme Court ih denying certiorari in the case of Carman v.
Fox Film Corp., 269 Fed. 928 (C. C. A. 2d, i2o), certiorari denied 255 U. S. 569, 41 Sup.
Ct. 323 (192o), wherein the lower court refused to set up an estoppel, but simply declined
to act because the plaintiff had misrepresented her age.
'-Murphy y. Holcer, 57 F. (2d) 431 (App. D. C. 1932) ; Steigerwalt v. Woodhead Co.,
supra note 25; Mestetzko v. The Elf Motor Co., ii Ohio St. 575, 165 N. E. 93 (1929) ;
Note (i927) 5 Tax. L. REv. 434; (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 57o. The Ohio court has
recently gone even farther, and has held an infant liable where he deposited a sum of
money with his employer to cover any shortage in the merchandise in his custody. There
was such a shortage, exceeding in value the amount of the deposit, and the court denied
relief to the infant when he sued to recover, the deposit. It will be observed that the goods
were never, strictly speaking, in the infant's possession, and it cannot be said that he bene-
fited directly by their use. Smith v. Newark Shoe Co., 182 N. E. 347 (Ohio App. 1932),
(1933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REV. 346.
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enjoyed. As to the second, many jurisdictions hold that misrepresentation of
capacity will not bar the infant's plea, while a few, particularly in equity, will
not permit it. Here again there is a compromise, represented by Myers v.
Hurley, which seems to be gaining in favor so rapidly that it may well become
the established rule.
It is obvious, in studying the cases, that the courts have been afraid to fly
in the face of established principles, and even where they have held the infant
to some measure of responsibility, they have endeavored to avoid so much as
the appearance of enforcing the contract against him.33  This reluctance is
justified by precedent, but fails to take into account the factors in modern life
which have created the necessity for a change in public policy as applied by the
courts. The infant of today is far more sophisticated and hence much better
versed in business customs than was his father. A vast number of sales are made
on the installment plan, and many infants take advantage of this system to make
purchases of automobiles and other articles which are usually classed as luxuries.
Giving them the power of disaffirmance in these cases is working a hardship
on business men, and as one case has pointed out," may of itself create in young
people a spirit of irresponsibility and a disregard for their obligations which is
scarcely conducive to good citizenship.
Under the conditions of modern life there can be no objection to the raising
of an estoppel against an infant who tricks another person into contracting with
him. It is true that this will enforce the contract against him, but the power
of the infant to disaffirm his contracts was originally granted because the courts
felt that he was unable to fend for himself in the business world; and when he
has by reason of the very transaction in suit given conclusive proof not only of
his ability to protect himself, but also that others need protection against him,
then the reason for the rule fails and the rule itself should not be applied in his
favor.
In many states, particularly in the western part of the country, the subject
is regulated by statute. Thus we find statutes preventing any infant who repre-
sents himself to be an adult, or who engages in business as an adult, from
disaffirming a contract resulting from such misrepresentation. 3 Others require
any person over the age of eighteen to restore all the consideration he has re-
ceived under a contract as a condition precedent to its disaffirmance, 0 and curtail
the infant's power of rescission in various ways.3 Although such statutes fail
' It was this timidity on the part of our courts which led the writer in Note (1921) 31
YAE L. J. 2oi, to say: "'Infantile Paralysis' is a term well applicable to the state of the law
governing an infant's responsibility for his contractual and tort obligations. The rigid nice-
ties involved are indeed perplexing. Infancy has ever been a safe base from which one might
embark upon piratical expeditions against innocent adults and to the technical defenses of
which he could return for security. Shall its sanctity be preserved when justice obviously
requires a remedy for the victims?"
Pettit v. Liston, supra note 23, at 470, 191 Pac. at 662.
S"No contract can be thus disaffirmed in cases where, on account of the minor's own
misrepresentations as to his majority, or from his having engaged in business as an adult,
the other party had good reason to believe him capable of contracting." IowA CODE (1931)
§ 10494; see also GA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1926) § 4285; WAsH. Coip'. STAT. (Remington,
1922) § 5830.
6 CaL. Civ. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 35; IDAHO CoMP. STAT. (1919) § 4585; IOWA CODE
(1931) § 10493: MONT. REv. CODE (Choate, 1921) § 5673; N. D. Comp. LAws ANN. (1913)
§434o; S. D. ComP. LAWS (1929) §83.
"In many states women become of full age at eighteen years. ARK. DIG. STAT. (Craw-
ford & Moses, 1921) §4986; IDAHO COMP. STAT. (1919) §4583; ILL REv. STAT. (Cahill,
1931) c. 64, § I; MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 79, §§ I, 7, 8, io; id. art. 93, § i9;
MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 87o6,- N. D. Comp. LAws ANN. (1913) § 4335; S. D. Comp.
L.ws (1929) § 76. A curious clause in CAL. Civ. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 36, provides that
an infant cannot disaffirm a contract, otherwise valid, to serve as an actor. This is obviously
designed to protect the motion picture industry in that state. ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford
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to take into account the case of an infant who is eighteen or more and yet unable
to contract intelligently, and may thereby work hardships by reason of the
difficulty in adjusting them to the particular case, they have had and will con-
tinue to have a decidedly salutary effect. Inasmuch as courts are inevitably
slow in recognizing and enforcing a changed public policy, the enactment of
such statutes is the simplest and best way of relieving a situation which has long
been a source of discontent to those who look to the law for fair and equitable
justice.
H. S. McM.
TESTAMENTARY USES OF BANK AccouNTs-The present uncertainty of
the law on the use of savings bank accounts for testamentary' purposes is
founded in the inclination of the majority of courts, on the one hand, to uphold
rigidly the purposes of the Statute of Wills, and of the minority, on the other
hand, to assist owners of small sums of money to dispose of their gifts after
death by means of bank accounts, without the expense of probate proceedings.
The intent of the depositor is admittedly the important factor on which the
adjudication of a particular situation should depend. This intent coupled with
the necessary observance of the Statute of Wills 2 may be interpreted in light
of the acts of the depositor as creating one of three broad relationships: a trust,
a gift, or a joint deposit. In order to determine the most desirable method for
a testamentary disposition of a bank account and to view the possibilities of
acquiring uniformity in the interpretation of the acts of the depositor, it will be
necessary to discuss the three relationships categorically.
Bank Accounts Held in Trust-When A deposits money in the form of
"A in trust 8 for B", the trust res to pass after death, the courts are faced with
two problems: (I) did A intend to create a trust for the benefit of, B, and, (2)
is the trust in violation of the Statute of Wills? In determining whether the
intent was to create a trust, the great majority of jurisdictions hold that the
form of deposit, "A in trust for B", raises only a presumption of a valid trust
,which may be rebutted by evidence of contradictory acts or words of the de-
positor, and that the beneficiary need have no notice of the trust.4 This rule
& Moses, 1921) § 6881, provides that when approved by the parent or guardian, or if there
is no parent or guardian, the contract of an infant over fifteen years of age shall be binding
if it does not run for more tfian one year. This apparently has reference to employment
contracts. By the IOWA CODE (1931) § 1O492, all minors attain their majority upon marriage,
a curious provision which admits of interesting speculation as to the possible consequences.
In Texas, when the infant is above the age of nineteen, he may have his disabilities removed
and thereafter shall be considered to be of full age for all purposes except voting. TEx. RFv.
Civ. CODE (Vernon, 1928) art. 5921.
'The use of the term "testamentary" in this note may be misleading. One of the pur-
poses of this discussion is to determine to what extent a depositor may act in using a bank
account as a method of disposing of gifts to take effect after death. Evasion of either the
letter or the spirit of the Statute of Wills is the inevitable result. However, as Mr. Justice
Holmes has said: "We do not speak of evasion, because when the law draws a line, a case
is on one side of it or the other, and if on the safe side is none the worse legally that a party
has availed himself of the full the law permits." Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625, 630,
36 Sup. Ct. 473, 474 (i9i6).
2 Springdale Nat. Bk. v. Ward, 122 Me. 227, 19i Atl. 529 (1923) ; Nutt v. Morse, 142
Mass. 1, 6 N. E. 763 (1886) ; Smith v. Speer, 34 N. J. Eq. 336 (88i).
'For a proper comprehension of the trust relation, it must be recognized that the deposi-
tor and not the bank is the trustee. See Sherman v. New Bedford Say. Bk., 138 Mass. 581,
583 (1885).
I Sayre v. Weil, 94 Ala. 466, 1O So. 546 (1892) ; Bath Say. Inst. v. Hathorn, 88 Me. 122,
33 Atl. 836 (i895) ; Merigan v. McGonigle, 205 Pa. 321, 54 Atl. 994 (19o3).
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had its origin, of course, in the courts' realization that very often the depositor
has some other motive for depositing his money in the form of a trust 5 than to
benefit the donee. Massachusetts, however, requires that the cestui que trust
must have notice of the existence of the trust before it can be held valid, and,
therefore, the Massachusetts rule tends to make more uniform the interpreta-
tion of the acts of the depositor. Although in some situations it will fail to
give effect to the intent of the depositor, yet, when it is considered that the
intent under the majority rule is often open to the uncertainty of weak evidence,
it is evident that the Massachusetts rule creates a more substantial support for
the courts to grasp in arriving at an accurate decision.7 The fact that the
majority of courts permit extrinsic evidence to be introduced indicates that
they are also in doubt as to the "donative" intent of the donor, but they do not
4ppear to realize that such evidence is always in great danger of being mis-
construed. Therefore, the Massachusetts view is more desirable, for if it can
be shown that the donor has informed the donee of the transaction, there can
then be little doubt that a gift inter vivos in the form of a trust was intended.
As a pure question of uniformity, the real difficulty lies in the fact that any
evidence is admissible to rebut the form of deposit, but the courts in admitting
such evidence properly do so in order to effectuate the intent of the depositor.
Unfortunately, however, they have initiated considerable uncertainty by failing
to create adequate uniformity as to what evidence will show the sufficiency or
lack of intent. Although the Massachusetts rule at times may hinder a correct
interpretation of the intent of the depositor, at least it protects that intent from
being distorted by uncertain evidence.
To determine whether the trust is in violation of the Statute of Wills, the
courts investigate the form and nature of the deposit. A reservation of a power
to revoke is held not necessarily to make a trust testamentary," nor is a reserva-
tion of a power to withdraw the interest. In order to be considered testamentary
it must be a a transaction in which complete control over the legal and beneficial
interest is retained by the depositor until his death,"0 that is, in which no ap-
' E. g., -an attempt to evade a by-law or a statute limiting the amount depositable by one
person. Brabrook v. Boston Five Cent Say. Bk., lO4 Mass. 228 (0870). Matter of Muller, i5
App. Div. 67, It re Dohrman's Estate, 44 N. Y. Supp. 28o (1897). Or an attempt to obtain
a higher rate of interest. Weber v. Weber, 9 Daly 211 (N. Y. 188o).
IWelch v. Henshaw, 17o Mass. 409, 49 N. E. 659 (1898). Accord: Burton v. Bridgeport
Say. Bk., 52 Conn. 398 (1885). Some of the uncertainty, as far as it affects the banks, has
been eliminated by legislative enactments which permit the bank, whenever the deposit has
been made in trust for the beneficiary and no further notice is given the bank to pay the cestld
que trust the proceeds of the deposit on the death of the trustee. The design of the statutes
has been to protect the banks and does not affect the situation between the parties. Twenty-
five states, including Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and New York now have such statutes.
PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 7, § 584 (applicable only to savings banks) ; MASs. GEN.
LAWS (921) c. 168, §34; N. Y. BANKING LAW (McKinney, 1916) §249 (2). For a com-
plete collection of these statutes see (1928) 45 BANKING L. J. 733, 813, 897.
Of course, if a trust of a savings bank deposit has been properly created and no power
of revocation reserved, it is as binding as any other form of trust and the settlor cannot
revoke. Sayre v. Wel, supra note 4; Minor v. Rogers, 40 Conn. 512 (1873).
7 On strict trust principles, of course, no notice to the beneficiary need ever be given, nor
would any evidence be admissible to rebut the form of the trust. However, because of the
peculiar uses made by some depositors of this form of deposit, the courts found it necessary,
in order to give effect to the donor's intent, to make exceptions to the ordinary trust law.
'This is in accord with the application of strict trust principles. Jones v. Old Colony
Tr. Co., 251 Mass. 309, 146 N. E. 716 (1925).
' Hallowell Say. Inst. v. Titcomb, 96 Me. 62, 51 Atl. 249 (igoi); Smith v. Ossipee
Valley Say. Bk., 64 N. H. 228, 9 At. 792 (0887). See also Booth v. Oakland Say. Bk., I=2
Cal. 1g, 54 Pac. 370 (1896) where it was held that withdrawal of principal does not neces-
sarily invalidate the trust. This theory is undoubtedly erroneous since it gives a full control
of the deposit to the donor until his death.
o See cases supra note 2.
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parent interest passes prior to the death of the trustee. New York by initiating
the tentative trust doctrine "- has arrived at a desirable solution. This doctrine
permits a right to be vested in the trustee to reserve a complete control in his
deposit until his death, when the amount remaining in the account passes to the
beneficiary. 12 Although the application of the New York rule is in violation of
the Statute of Wills,13 the courts of that state have readily followed the decision
that established it,14 and by so doing have instituted a machinery which aids
materially in effectuating the intent of the depositor. 5 This decision minimizes
the always imminent uncertainty which exists in jurisdictions which do not
follow it. This uncertainty sometimes causes unfortunate results: for example,
if the depositor is found to have created a trust at the time of the deposit, then
his later actions in withdrawing amounts may make his estate liable to the
Matter of Totten, 179 N. Y. 112, 125, 71 N. E. 748, 752 (1904) ; "A deposit by one
person of his own money in his own name as trustee for another, standing alone, does not
establish an irrevocable trust during the lifetime of the depositor. It is a tentative trust
merely, revocable at will, until the depositor dies or completes the gift in his lifetime by
some unequivocal act or declaration, such as delivery of the passbook or notice to the bene-
ficiary. In case the depositor dies before the beneficiary without revocation, or some decisive
act or declaration of disaffirmance, the presumption arises that an absolute trust was created
as to the balance on hand at the death of the depositor." This case was so decided primarily
to make more positive the bank deposit trust cases, for it had formerly been the tendency
of the New York courts to declare a trust existent if the trustee died first, Martin v. Funk,
75 N. Y. 134 (1878) ; and non-existent" if the beneficiary died first, no other evidence being
available than the form of the deposit in trust. Beaver v. Beaver, 117 N. Y. 421, = N. E.
94o (i888) : Cunningbham v. Davenport, 147 N. Y. 4.3, 41 N. E. 412 (189.).
' Relative to the New York rule, it seems that there is authority to the effect that the
depositor's death is not the condition precedent to the creation of the trust, but that the trust
is initiated at the time of the deposit and is subject to a condition subseiuent of revocation.
Scott, Trusts and the Statute of Wills (1930) 43 H-Iv. L REv. 521, 543. Although this
reasoning has a tendency to disguise the testamentary character of the rule, the mere fact
that the transaction is tentative indicates that it is not a completed trust until death. See
Bogert, The Creation of Trusts by Means of Bank Deposits (I916) I CoR. L. Q. 159, 171,
n. 86; Larremore, $rdicial Legislation in New York (19o5) 14 YAIE L. J. 312, 315.
" A peculiar situation arises where a will is made subsequent to the creation of a tentative
trust and in conflict with it. Both the trust and the will take effect at the same moment, viz,
the death of the depositor, and any solution seems questionable. However, the New York
courts have ruled very reasonably that the making of the inconsistent will indicates an intent
to revoke the trust, and, although the will itself does not take effect until death, it is suffi-
cient evidence to signify an intention on the part of the testator to revoke the trust before
his death. See Note (1932) 42 YA=E L. J. 141. If the will is made before the tentative
trust and disposes of the accounts to which the trust refers, the difficulty is more extreme.
It would probably be held that the will should take precedence over the tentative trust on the
ground that the formality of the will is stronger evidence of the intent of the decedent to
dispose of his accounts by this method; otherwise, he would have changed the will when he
created the tentative trust.
' In re Kine's Estate, 139 Misc. 273, 248 N. Y. Supp. 677 (1931) ; It re Schiffer's Estate,
142 Misc. 548, 254 N. Y. Supp. 871' (ig31).
Minnesota followed the New York rule in contradistinction to the majority rule, and
at first did so under the assumption that the difference between the two lies not so much in
the validity of the trust but in the sufficiency of the evidence to show the intent to make a
trust. Walso v. Lattemer, 140 Minn. 455, 168 N. W. 353 (1918). See, however, Dyste v.
Farmers' & Mech. Bk., 179 Minn. 430, 229 N. W. 865 (1930), where the tentative trust
theory now seems substantially to be adopted by Minnesota. California in the recent case of
Kuck v. Raftery, 117 Cal. App. 755, 4 P. (2d) 552 (I93I), followed the broader and major-
ity ruling on the question bf intent, and discussed the tentative trust question but did not
commit itself.
'Under the New York rule, of course, the power of revocation exists whether reserved
or not. The intent of the depositor is considered the important element and the tentative
trust was created not primarily to make a testamentary trust possible, but to initiate a policy
which would facilitate the carrying out of the depositor's intent. If the depositor clearly
intends to rely on the trust as a means of disposing of his account after death, rather than
on a will, there should be no valid objection. See Leaphart, The Trust as a Substitute for a
Will (193o) 78 U. or PA. L. Rav. 626, 637.
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beneficiary; while if it was found that no trust was created, because of some
testamentary characteristic, then the beneficiary is denied the right which the
testator may have clearly intended him to possess. There are some grounds,
however, for the view that the doctrine of the tentative trust creates an unwar-
ranted exception to the Statute of Wills, principal among these being (I) that
creditors of the decedent may never discover the assets of such a transaction,
(2) that the Statute of Wills is intended to protect the rights of legatees, and
(3) that the Statute is also designed to prevent fraud. The first of these three
objections is unquestionably the most pertinent when it is considered how
effectively the tentative trust could be used to defraud creditors. The tendency
of the tentative trust, however, to create uniformity in bank deposit cases and
the practicability of the application of the doctrine more than outweighs the
equities of creditors' rights. There is little substance in the arguments that
the Statute of Wills is designed to protect legatees and to prevent fraud, for it
is evident that the bank is an adequate recording agent of the intent of the
decedent. There is no reason why the latter should not dispose of his property
after death by such an instrument as a deposit, rather than by a will, if such
instrument can be depended upon to be valid.
Generally, the principal difficulty with the trust as a substitute for a will is
that some interest must pass to the beneficiary when the trust is created. But
since a power of revocation can be reserved and the interest of the beneficiary
thereby cut off at any time during the life of the depositor, the trust deposit is
a highly desirable instrument for avoiding expensive probate proceedings.:"
A general recognition of the New York rule, and the resultant elimination of
the necessity of formal revocation in order to regain control over the deposit,
would make more certain the courts' interpretation of the depositor's intent.'
7
Bank Accounts Tranfferred as a Gift-The pure gift-as distinguished
from a gift by trust or by joint deposit '-of a bank account is not sufficiently
I Although the question of inheritance and state taxation is of some importance, the trust
transfer is generally taxable if the legal benefit does not pass until after the death of the
depositor. The transfef-of a revocable trust is made taxable for state inheritance purposes
in most states (where death taxes are levied) by statute. N. Y. TAX LAW (McKinney,
1916) § ---a (2). In other states, where there are no specific statutes, the courts tax the
trust res on the ground that a revocable transfer in trust is intended to take effect in enjoy-
ment or possession after death; In re Fulham's Estate, 96 Vt. 308, 119 Atl. 433 (1923) ;
Trust Co. of Norfolk v. Commonwealth, 151 Va. 883, 141 S. E. 825 (1928). See, in criticism
of this view, Stimson, When Revocable Trusts are Subject to Inheritance Tax (1927) 25
MIcH. L. REv. 839, 843, where it is aptly pointed out that the interest of the beneficiary
passes and vests immediately on the making of the trust, since otherwise there would be no
validly existent trust. In Illinois, a revocable trust is not taxable as long as the power to
revoke, reserved by the grantor, is inserted for the benefit of the cestuis que trustent. People
v. Northern Tr. Co., 289 Ill. 475, 124 N. E. 662 (1919). If only a portion of the trust is
revocable then only that portion is taxable. N. Y. TAx LAW (McKinney, 1916) § 248 (2).
Irrevocable trusts are only taxable when made in contemplation of death or to take effect
in enjoyment or possession after death. People v. Northern Tr. Co., supra.
The Federal Government taxes all revocable trusts, and also irrevocable trusts made in
contemplation of, or to take effect after, death. 44 STAT. 70 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. § lO94
(c), (d) (i928).
'- In the Restatement of the Law of Trusts, the New York rule has been tentatively
adopted, making the savings bank trust an exception to the general law which holds that,
although the settlor may reserve the power to revoke and modify the trust, yet if he
reserves an unlimited power to control the details of the administration of the trust, the
intended trust is testamentary. TRUSTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 193o) § 65. See also
Explanatory Notes on Trusts (Am. L. Inst. i3o) § 65. In New Jersey, the tentative trust
theory has been expressly repudiated. Nicklas v. Parker, 69 N. J. Eq. 743, 61 Atl. 267019o5).
"It is essential that a gift by means of a joint bank account be distinguished from the
gift discussed in this section, for although the former involves most of the characteristics
of the latter, there is generally a dual control in the joint account, whereas complete posses-
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adequate for the general testamentary purposes of the depositor. In both the
gift inter vivos and gift causa nwrtis an immediate legal interest must pass
completely,19 and in the latter the donor must be in apprehension of death.
20
This inadequacy is accentuated by the great care 2' which the courts exercise in
interpreting the sufficiency of the evidence to show the necessary intent 2 of
the depositor to make a gift. Delivery 23 in some form, coupled with a clear
intent to make an immediate donation 24 are held by the courts to be the two
important elements necessary for a completed and valid gift. However, although
the rules of law and inclinations of the court as outlined above are given com-
plete lip service in all jurisdictions, many courts are prone to considerable
elasticity in the application of the law of gifts to particular circumstances.2 5
When, in cases of bank accounts transferred as gifts, the intent of the depositor
is clear even though his actions would ordinarily be termed insufficient to prove
a gift causa nortis, many courts effectively give expression to the donor's intent,
while at the same time ignoring the letter of the law. 20 The fact, however, that
there is opportunity for liberal interpretation of the requisites of a valid delivery
may also easily lead to the imposition of restrictions in order to avoid the gift,
depending on the attitude of the court towards the justice of the donee's cause.
The result of this type of interpretation is the usual uncertainty as to whether
the donor's intent will in fact be given effect.
sion must pass in the ordinary gift. For an annotation of the present law of gifts of bank
accounts, see (1926) 40 A. L. R. 1249.
"First & Tristate Nat. Bk. v. Caywood, 176 X. E. 871 (Ind. App., 1931); Walsh's
Appeal, 122 Pa. 177, 15 At. 470 (1888).
" 'See In re Van Wormer's Estate, 255 Mich. 399, 238 N. W. 210 (1931) ; Grymes v.
Hone, 49 N. Y. 17 (1872).
I See Note (1932) 32 COL L. RFv. 702, 7o6.
"2-But the intent of the depositor is not given the same consideration in the case of a
gift as in the case of a trust. The intent is subservient, supposedly, to the elements necessary
to make a gift. Howard v. Dingley, 122 Me. 5, 118 Atl. 592 (922).
" Delivery must include an intent to transfer the gift, previous continued possession being
insufficient. Drew v. Hagerty, 81 Me. 234, 17 AtI. 63 (I899). The delivery, however, may
be constructive. Thus the transfer of a key, to a. box containing the bank book, or delivery
of the book to a third person as agent for the donee is valid. Debinson v. Emmans, 158
Mass. 592, 33 N. E. 7o6 (1893); Callanan v. Clement, iS Misc. 621, 42 N. Y. Supp. 514
(1896). Virginia, by statute, has attempted to make the evidence of the delivery more certain
by requiring that "if the donor and donee reside together at the time of the gift, possession
at the place of their residence shall not be sufficient possession within the meaning of the
section." VA. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 193o) § 5142. This, however, has been held to be inap-
plicable to gifts causa inortis. Thomas' Adm'r v. Lewis et al., 89 Va. 1, 15 S. E. 389 (1891).
-4 See cases supra note 19.
Stephenson's Adm'r v. King, 81 Ky. 425 (1883) (delivery of letter describing gift);
Castle v. Persons, 117 Fed. 835 (C. C. A. 8th, 19o2) (oral gift of a debt) ; Teague v. Abbott,
51 Ind. App. 6o4, ioo N. E. 27 (1912) (where donee's knowledge of the combination of a
safe where the gift was deposited and an oral granting of the gift therein was held suffi-
cient) ; Waite v. Grubbe, 43 Ore. 498, 73 Pac. 206 (19o3) (where donor pointed out places
on farm where gold was buried). See also Whatley v. Mitchell, 24 Ga. App. 174, 100 S. E.
22(1919). The tendency of the law of gifts seems inclined towards an abolition of the
necessity of delivery. Until it fully accomplishes this, however, inexplicable exceptions,
similar to those above, will only confuse the law and augment further precariousness in the
execution of the donor's intent.
- Probably the most striking exception to the ordinary law is the gift of insurance
policies, where, in some jurisdictions, delivery of the policy is unnecessary to complete the
transfer of the proper interest. Taylor v. Coburn, 202 N. C. 324, 162 S. E. 748 (1932) ;
see (1932) 46 HARv. L. REv. 153. New York seems to have stepped well beyond the bounds
of the original rule of delivery. Millerl v. Silverman, 247 N. Y. 447, 16o N. E. 91o (1928).
"Any act on the part of the owner of a chose in action, showing not only a present intention
to transfer but that he regards himself as having carried such intention into effect is suffi-
cient and written evidence of the transaction is not required." Kaufmann v. Commissioner
of Int. Rev., 44 F. (2d) 144, 145"(C. C. A. 3d, 193o).
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Inasmuch as the pure gift inter r, ivas is not of sufficient applicability 27 for
the purposes of a testamentary disposition and as the evidence necessary to
show an intent to give and delivery are very nearly identical, 2 it will be sufficient
to discuss the gift causa inortis without further reference to the gift inter vivos.
Gifts causa mortis were at one time viewed with considerable suspicion because
of their testamentary character and the opportunities presented to practice
fraud.29 That they were and still are testamentary in nature cannot be doubted,
for the donor, whether reserving it or not, retains a power of complete revoca-
tion until his death, and the total interest, in effect, does not pass to the donee
until the death of the donor. But it is now universally recognized that they
are a valid means of transferring an interest.30 The evidence showing that
there was an intent to give and a delivery, and that the donor, at the time of the
making of the gift, was in immediate expectation of death"' may be given by
parol. Although a tangible chose in action formerly was held impossible of
delivery and therefore not an adequate subject of a gift, now, in all jurisdictions
it is held deliverable.3 2 In every state in which the matter has been adjudicated,
except Pennsylvania,3 the transferring of the passbook of a savings bank ac-
count is sufficient evidence of delivery to create a valid gift."4 It is apparent,
'A valid gift inter vivos must pass beyond recall, and no power of revocation is retain-
able; In re Van Wormer's Estate, supra note 20; and complete control must be vested in the
donee; Jones v. Crisp, 1O9 Md. 30, 71 AtI. 515 (19o8) ; Stevenson v. Earl, 65 N. J. Eq. 721,
55 Atl. lO91 (19o3). Cf. Candee v. Connecticut Say. Bk., 81 Conn. 372, 71- Atl. 551 (19o8)
where interest retained by the donee was held not to invalidate the gift.
The elements present in the gift causa mortis but lacking in the gift inter vivos are:
(i) the donor may revoke at any time before he dies; (2) the gift is not complete until the
donor dies; (3) the donee must outlive the donor; (4) the gift is subject to creditors' rights
against the donor. See Yancey v. Field, 85 Va. 756, 76o, 8 S. E. 721, 722 (1892). But the
delivery must pass with it a present power to enforce the chose m action or the gift will
be held testamentary. See Basket v. Hassell, iO7 U. S. 6o2, 614, 2 Sup. Ct. 415, 422 (882).
It is, however, sometimes held that qualifications in a gift causa inortis of a bank
account do not defeat the validity of the gift. Curtis v. Portland Say. Bk., 77 Me. 151
(1885) (order to pay funeral expenses of donor out of deposit) ; Louche v. Johnson, 7o App.
Div. 5o5, 24 N. Y. Supp. 267 (1893) (order to divide bank account with another). But
courts are prone to view such qualifications with suspicion. Hart v. Ketchum, 121 Cal. 426,
53 Pac. 931 (1898) ; Thomas' Adm'r v. Lewis et al., supra note 23.
'For a thorough discussion of the history of the law of gifts causa mortis see Foley v.
Harrison, 233 Mo. 46o, 508-584, 136 S. W. 354, 367-392 (91o). See also Note (1932) 32
CoL L. REv. 702.
"See Note (1928) 7 TFNN. L. REv. 46.
'But it need not be in expectation of immediate death. Williams v. Guile, 117 N. Y. 343,
22 N. E. lO7i (1889); Moore v. Shifflett, 187 Ky. 7, 216 S. W. 614 (92o). Although
there is no doubt that gifts cauisa vwrtis are necessary in order to enable a testator to dispose
of his property at a time when there is little opportunityi to make a will, this does not make
them any the less testamentary in character.
See Bruton, The Requirement of Delivery as Applied to Choses in Action (193o) 39
YAiE L. J. 837; Williston, Gifts of Rights Under Contracts in Writing by Delivery of the
Writing (193o) 4o YAm L. J. i.
Pennsylvania from the time of Walsh's Appeal, supra note i, has repeatedly dissented
from the great weight of authority. There are some grounds for this minority view since it
tends to restrict opportunities for fraud. However, this preventive element is obviously over-
shadowed in many cases where the clear intent of the depositor was to pass title. The rule
was somewhat lessened in its harshness in the Superior Court decision of In re Vance, 162
Atl. 346 (Pa. Super. 1932), but has unfortunately recently been declared to be still in full
force by the Supreme Court. In re Grigonis' Estate, 3o7 Pa. 183, i6o Atl. 706 (1932). See
also Crist's Estate, 162 AtI. 478 (Pa. Super. I932).
However delivery of the book coupled with an assignment is sufficient even in Pennsyl-
vania. Kelly v. Huplits, 1O3 Pa. Sup. 430, 157 Atl. 704 (193).
"Delivery of the bank book of a savings account is held sufficient inasmuch as it is a rule
in such institutions that the book must be presented before a withdrawal may be made. The
book, in effect, controls the deposit and evidences the obligation of the bank to the holder
of it. Wade v. Edwards, 23 Ga. App. 677, 99 S. E. 16o (1919). A savings bank department
in a commercial bank is similar for donative purposes to the ordinary savings bank. Snidow
v. Brotherton, 140 Va. 187, 124 S. E. 182 (1924) ; see (193) 7 IND. L. J. 137.
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therefore, that the evidence necessary to prove a gift is of little more strict a
nature than that necessary to prove a trust. Yet if the trust is tainted with
testamentary characteristics, it is declared void because of the Statute of Wills,
while the gift causa nortis, fundamentally testamentary, is held valid. Although
a complete control passes in the gift relation and not in the trust, it is ineffectual
since withdrawal, the only manifestation of control available to the donor, is
prohibited until his death.
The gift causa nortis, therefore, although of restricted opportunities for
testamentary purposes, is obviously an exception in the law of the Statute of
Wills. That the courts have universally recognized such an exception evidences
the fact that, where the particular situation warrants it, the Statute will be con-
sidered inapplicable. There is reason for viewing the tentative trust as another
valid exception to the Statute. Since a prima facie doubt as to the validity of
the donee's claim arises from the nere fact that the donor dies before any dis-
pute arises as to the validity of the gift, and since that difficulty does not arise
in the trust cases, the bank being an adequate recording agent of the intent of
the donor, the necessity of a strict application of the law is more apparent in
the law of gifts 3' than in the law of trusts. However, the courts, professing
concern over the donor's intent, frequently will defeat that intent because of the
Statute of Wills, whereas, on the other hand, they will uphold a gift causa
nortis-, where the intent seldom appears with equal clarity. 6
Bank Account Transferred by Joint Deposit-Perhaps the most marked
discord in the problem of savings bank accounts exists where one depositor
deposits his money in the name of himself and another. The uncertainty in the
law applied is due to the mottled influence of old prejudices against joint
tenancies, new legislation for the protection of banks and depositors, doubt as
to the legal label of a particular situation at hand, and a general aura of uncer-
tainty surrounding the depositor's intent. At common law a joint deposit is
determined by the acts of the depositor and the precise form of the deposit to
be either a valid gift,3 trust,3 contract, 9 or joint tenancy.40  If the evidence
tend to disclose that a gift was intended, but that no right of survivorship was
mentioned, then in those states which have abolished joint tenancies, the donee
can take only half of the deposit on the death of the donor.4 If a right of
survivorship was stipulated and the transaction has not involved elements of a
However, pass books of commercial banks are not sufficient evidence of the obligation
of the bank, and their delivery does not effectuate the gift. Goodson v. Liles, 99 Ala. 441, 96
So. 262 (1892); Szabo v. Speckman, 73 Fla. 374, 74 So. 411 (I917). See Note (1927)
5 N. Y. L. Rxv. 404.
The fact that there appear to be, with respect to gifts, no adjudicated appellate cases
between the donor and the donee, and that the litigation occurs always between the donee and
the donor's estate, indicates that there are substantial grounds for investigating thoroughly the
donee's claim.
I There is little opportunity of escaping taxation on gifts causa mnorlis of bank accounts.
Gifts in contemplation of death are taxable everywhere except in Georgia, Maine, Maryland,
Texas and Vermont (and in those states also which do not levy death duties). PINKERTON,
INHERITANCE AND EsTATE TAXES (1926) § 132. See for example, PA. STAT. ANN. (Pur-
don, i93o) tit. 72, § 23oI (c); N. Y. TAx LAw (McKinney, i916) § 249b (c); CAL. GEN.
LA-ws (Deering, 1931) Act 8443, § 2 (3a). "In contemplation of death' is held to have a
broader application than to merely donatio causa inortis. Gifts inter vivos made in con-
temnplation of death are also taxable. Conway's Estate v. State ex rel. Klaus, 12o N. E. 717
(Ind. Am). igi) ; PINKERToN, o. cd. supro § 133.
T Kelly v. Beers, 194 N. Y. 49, 86 N. E. 98o (igog).
I Booth v. Oakland Say. Bk., i22 Cal. 19, 54 Pac. 37o (i898).
"Deals' Adm'r v. Merchants' & Mechanics' Say. Bk., i2o Va. 297, 9i S. E. 135 (1917);
Chippendale v. North Adams Say. Bk., 2 Mass. 499, 1ii N. E. 371 (I916) (novation).
I Erwin v. Felter. 283 Ill. 36, 1ig N. E. 926 (i9g8).
"In re Crawford, 245 Ill. App. 2=7 (1924) ; Leach's Estate, 282 Pa. 545, 128 Atl. 497
(1925).
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testamentary character, the donee may claim the balance on the death of the
depositor.4 2 In the joint deposit the right of survivorship is sometimes based
on contract, 43 and sometimes-generally because of statutes-on the ground
that a joint tenancy has been created.44  In those few cases where the deposit
has been held to have created a trust the courts appear to have made an unwar-
ranted extension of the law of deposits in trust for the purpose of doing justice
in a particular situation.45  To create a survivorship some appropriate words
showing sufficient intent must appear, and if it is shown by other evidence that
no interest in praesenti ever passed to the donee, the transfer is held to be in
violation of the Statute of Wills. 46  If the donor, however, passes a sufficient
interest to the donee, he does not defeat the gift by retaining the passbook until
his death. 47  It is evident, therefore, that, since the courts are free to apply
either the law of gifts, trusts, joint tenancies, or contracts to almost any given
situation, considerable confusion arises from the use of this form of deposit.
Because of this confusion in the law applied, and also because of the suspicion
of the courts towards a relationship where some control over the deposit is
retained by the depositor until his death, the joint deposit is not a dependable
method for disposing of accounts after death. As a result of this maze of pos-
sible interpretations the banks formerly were put in an unfortunate position if
they paid the fund to the wrong party. To prevent further uncertainties-
insofar as the banks were affected-legislation was enacted permitting a bank,
where an account appeared "A or B, or survivor", to treat the transaction as a
joint tenancy and to pay the survivor.48  These statutes, however, are generally
held not to affect the rights of the parties inter se.
The intent of the depositor, of course, should be the controlling element.
However, as in the gift and trust cases, the depositor is generally dead when
the litigation arises and there is the attendant difficulty in ascertaining his intent.
This difficulty is made more extreme 4 by admitting evidence to disprove the
'* Erwin v. Felter, supra note 40; Kaufman v. Edwards, 92 N. J. Eq. 554, 113 Atl. 598
(1927).
. Illinois Trust & Say. Bk. v. Van Vlack, 310 Ill. I85, I4I N. E. 546 (1923) ; Chippen-
dale v. North Adams Say. Bk., supra note 39.
"In re Estate of Johnson, I16 Neb. 686, 218 N. W. 739 (1928). There is a logical
objection to terming the transaction a joint tenancy, for by common law applicable to joint
tenancies no withdrawal could have been made. Staple v. Berry, ilO Me. 32, 85 Atl. 3o3
(1912); Note (1929) 1.5 CoRN. L. Q. 96. oo.
Maine has been strict in applying the common law of joint tenancies to joint bank
accounts, and appears to require the traditional unities of time, title, interest and possession.
Heard v. Gurdy, 127 Me. 480, 144 Atl. 399 (I928): Garlands' Appeal, =26 Me. 84, 136 Atl.
459 (927).
Booth v. Oakland Say. Bk., supra note 38. Cf. Sturgis v. Citizens' Nat. Bk., 152 Md.
654, 137 Atl. 378 (927).
'When the form of deposit is the only evidence available, then it governs the intent. A
mere form "A or' B" is not sufficient to create a survivorship. Engelbrecht v. Englebrecht,
323 Ill. 208, 153 N. E. 827 (1926); Commercial Trust Co. v. White, 99 N. J. Eq. 119, 132 Atl.
761 (1926). If the passbook recites a holding as joint tenants, or, with some other appropriate
words, shows a right of survivorship, such evidence is sufficient. Commercial Trust Co. v.
White, supra.
Ir Commercial Trust Co. v. White, supra note 46; cf. In re Kanrath's Estate, 114 Neb.
230, 206 N. W. 770 (1925) (certificates of deposit).
IN. Y. BANKING LAW (McKinney, 1916) §249; MICH. Comp. LAws (i92g) § 12063;
MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 7711; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §230. For a full
collection of these statutes see (928) 45 BANKING L. J. 733, 813, 897.
41 The fact that some courts have attempted to aid depositors in making a testamentary
disposition of their small accounts, merely increases the confusion, particularly because these
adjudications generally are not based on express repudiation of precedent. These decisions,
however, disclose a desired tendency of the law to apply the Statute of Wills only where its
spirit is broken rather than where its letter alone is ignored. First Nat. Bk. v. Mulich, 83
Colo. 518, 266 Pac. IiO (1928) (where donee could not draw on the deposit until the death
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presumption of a right of survivorship raised by the form of the deposit.
New York, in dealing with savings bank litigation, has lessened much of the
confusion by enacting a statute5 0 making the form of the deposit conclusive
evidence of a joint tenancy after the death of the depositor. This closely
approximates the tentative trust theory, since no notice or control need ever be
passed to the donee until after the death of the donor, the only difference being
that once the deposit is made in the statutory form no subsequent attempt at
revocation is admissible as evidence after the death of either of the joint ten-
ants.51 Except in New York, therefore, the joint deposit is not only open to the
same hazards as the trust relation, but it is also a more difficult mode of retaining
the control desired by a depositor who wishes to make a testamentary disposition
of his account. As the New York rule is merely one of evidence, in no way
invading the sanctity of the Statute of Wills, other states should adopt it.
Probably the most effective and logical result may be attained by applying
the law of contracts to the joint deposit situation. This would minimize the
necessity of legislation, and would at the same time, permit the courts to execute
the donor's intent without taking into consideration the Statute of Wills. This
has been attempted and has been successful where the donee was a party to the
transaction,5 2 but unfortunately has been repudiated where it was claimed that
it was a third party beneficiary contract.5 3 The law of third party beneficiaries,
however, could have been applied. When A deposits for the benefit of B, the
gift to take effect after death, there is consideration in A's depositing in the
bank and in the bank accepting the deposit and promising to pay A or B as A
shall direct. Since the Statute of Wills has no application to such contracts, its
terms would remain inviolate, and since the intent of A could be determined by
the agreement and also his actions, the result would be that the courts' deter-
mination of the intent of the donor would not be overshadowed by the terms of
the Statute of Wills.
of the donee) ; In re Estate of Johnson, supra note 44 (where no interest in praesenti was
passed) ; Cleveland Trust Co. v. Scobie, i14 Ohio. St. 241, 51i N. E. 373 (1926). See also
MeKenna v. McKenna, 26o Mass. 481, 157 N. E. 517 (,927).
cWN. Y. BANKING LANW (McKinney, 1916) § 249, par. 3. A few states have statutes
making a joint deposit a presumptive joint tenancy. Houle v. McMillan, 83 Colo. 216. 263
Pac. 409 (1928) ; Ball v. Mercantile Trust Co., 220 Mo. App, i165, 297 S. W. 415 (1927) ;
In re Estate of Johnson, supra note 44. CoLo. ANN. STAT. (Mills, 1930) § 381 (x) ; Mo.
Rxv. STAT. ('929) § 5400; NEB. Comp. STAT. (i922) § 8046. It is interesting to note that
the latter statute appears to be merely bank protecting legislation. Other states under
similarly worded statutes have not extended their interpretations to make the transaction a
joint tenancy between the parties. Gordon v. Toler, 83 N. J. 25, 89 Atl. Io2o (1914).
Moskowitz v. Marrow, 251 N. Y. 380, 167 N. E. 5o6 (i929).
r Illinois Trust & Say. Bk. v. Van Vlack, supra note 43; Chippendale v. North Adams
Say. Bk., spra note 42; New Jersey Tit. & Tr. Co. v. Archibald, 91 N. J. Eq. 82, io8 At.
434 (1919).
'IMcGillivray v. First Nat. Bk., 56 N. D. 152, 217 N. W. 15o (1927) ; see Note (1926)
2 IND. L. J. 178; (1929) 3 CiN. L. REv. 317. It is sometimes difficult to discover on what
theory the court has determined survivorship. Osterland v. Schroeder, 22 Ohio App. 213, 153N. E. 7.s8 (0926).
'Where the joint bank account is created only for the apparent purpose of passing title
to the survivor at the death of the donor, the transfer is subject to most inheritance tax
statutes. There are four theories of taxation of the transfer of a joint bank account where
the intent is not necessarily to pass title after death: (I) The property passes at the time of
the creation of the jofit estate and therefore is not taxable as a transfer after death. See
for example, CONx. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 136z; W. VA. COD- (Michie, 1932) § 842 (d).
(2) Each of the joint tenants has an interest in the property to the extent of his contribu-
tion, but the part not contributed by the survivor is subject to the tax. Carr's Estate, 30
Dist. 481 (Pa. i921). (3) The survivor does not receive the undisputed title to the property
until the death of the co-tenant and therefore the whole amount is taxable. ILr. Ray. STAT.
(Cahill, i93i) c. i2o, § 396 (5). In other states this rule applies except to that portion
of the amount which never belonged to the deceased. CAL GEN. LAws (Deering, 1931)
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Recapitulatioiw--What, then, is the most satisfactory method of disposing
testamentarily of bank accounts under the present law, and what trend should
the law take in a solution of the attendant difficulties? Unquestionably the
trust relation is the one most pregnant with the desired elements. Although
there is the always present danger that the courts will interpret the relation as
being, in effect, a testamentary disposition, a judiciously arranged agreement,
coupled with the passing of some substantial interest, will ordinarily meet with
judicial approval. As a generally useful method for testamentary purposes it
is a fortunate arrangement, primarily because of the power of revocation and
reservation of interest until the death of the trustee. The gift causa inortis is,
of course, confined to the particular circumstances of proximity of death, while
the joint bank account, besides being the most uncertain of the three, is gen-
erally held to necessitate the passing of some power of withdrawal during the
life of the donor.
The most desirable result can, undoubtedly, only be attained by legislative
enactment. The New York rule on tentative trusts and joint bank accounts
would be an adequate foundation for such legislation', but even this liberal rule
needs extension if any uniformity is ever to be attained. The whole uncertainty
lies in the power given the courts and juries to determine the intent of the
depositor. In an ideal jurisdiction where every court and jury would think
identically under the same set of circumstances, there might be some semblance
of uniformity relative to their determinations, but such perfection is unfor-
tunately unattainable in the practice of modern courts. It must rest with the
legislatures, therefore, to formulate rules of law which can be used in every
case to show what concuive presumptions may be drawn from the acts of the
depositor. A set of rules, similar in effect to the New York "evidence" rule
on joint bank accounts, but applicable to all three situations would lend itself
to the creation of the desired uniformity and certainty. Under such legislation
the banks would then be able to give reliable advice to small depositors on the
legal effect of a particular form of deposit. The dangers in establishing these
exceptions to the Statute of Wills are more than outweighed by the desirability
of exempting small depositors from the burden of expensive probate proceed-
ings. The trend of the law as evidenced by the liberal and far-sighted view
taken by the New York courts and the various legislatures is a step towards the
desired conclusion. It is a trend, however, that requires considerable acceleration.
I. H. C.
INADEQUACY OF TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS IN THE TREATMENT OF THE
PROMOTER-The corporate promoter was unknown to the common law. He
had no function to perform in society until the birth of that creature of legisla-
tion-the corporation. When controversies began to arise in which promoters
were involved the courts were, of course, without direct precedents. These
emergencies were met as similar problems had been faced in the past: by casting
about in the mass of adjudicated situations for serviceable analogies. With the
flexibility characteristic of our judicial process, judges examined the various
branches of established law in their search for points upon which to fasten the
rationale of the results which they deemed socially expedient. As a matter of
fact, the available decisions revealed no one figure who even approximated the
promoter. The complexity of the promoter's activities and his anomalous posi-
Act 8443, § 2 (5); N. Y. TAx LAw (McKinney, i916) § 220 (5). (4) Some states are
indefinite, their statutes simply stating that any interest of the decedent passing to the
survivor is taxable. Apiz. CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 3181; VA. CoDE ANN. (Michie,
r93o) Aip. Tax Code, § 98. See PINKERTON, op. cit. supra note 36, c. Oi.
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tion forced courts to borrow concepts liberally from the law of agency, trusts,
partnership, and contracts. When particularly hard pressed, the chameleon-hued
word "fiduciary" was relied upon. The result, in effect, is that there is really
no theory of promoters as such. There is merely a mass of decisions which are
not reducible to any legal common denominator.
Pre-incorporation contracts between third parties and promoters on behalf
of a corporation about to be formed are a fertile source of litigation in which
the promoter figures. Courts have generally refused to recognize such contracts
as binding on the corporation after it comes into existence.' The reason behind
the rule is the dogma that a corporation must not come into existence cum onere.
"Any other rule would be dangerous in the extreme, inasmuch as
promoters are proverbially profuse in their promises, and if the corpora-
tion were to be bound by them, it would be subject to many unknown, unjust,
and heavy obligations. The only protection of the stockholders and of
subsequent corporate creditors against such a result lies in the rule that the
corporation is not bound by the contracts of its promoters." 2
Except under certain conditions, however, the promoters are themselves bound.8
The method of explanation used draws heavily on agency analogies. The pro-
moter, it has been said, has attempted to act as an agent for a nonexistent
principal; therefore, unless there is an express condition to the contrary, he is
personally bound.4 Other lines of reasoning deny the promoter even the dubious
comforts incidental to the agency theory and treat him as a rank outsider.
Lyon, J. in a frequently quoted passage from his opinion in Buffington v.
Bardon,5 says:
"The law is that a corporation is liable for its own acts only after it
has a legal existence. Until that time no one, whether a promoter or not,
can sustain to the corporation the relation of agent. Were this not so, we
would have an agent without a principal, which is an absurdity."
Courts, however, have felt it desirable to allow corporations, after becoming
fully formed, to assume these contracts. There is then presented the difficulty
of permitting the corporation to become a party to the original contract.
England, carrying the outsider theory to its logical conclusion, has found the
problem impossible of solution." A corporation can only make an entirely new
contract with the third party on the same terms as the promoter's contract.
7
' Odum v. South Atlantic Casket Co., 3o Ga. App. 166, 117 S. E. 275 (1923) ; cf. Bat-
telle v, Northwestern Cement Co., 37 Minn. 89, 33 N. W. 327 (1887). A corporation may
become liable on such a contracf by reason of a provision in its articles of association, or by
force of statute. i FLrcHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF COR'OATIONS (Perm. ed. 1931) § 206.
ICoou, CoioRA~oNs (8th ed. 1923) 2889.
'aAmerican Paper Bag Co. v. Van Nortwick, 52 Fed. 752 (C. C. A. 7th, 1892) ; Carmody
v. Powers, 6o Mich. 26, 26 N. W. 8Ol (1886) ; see Bradshaw v. Jones, 152 S. W. 695 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1912). They are not personally liable if it is understood that the other party shall
look to the corporation only. See Queen City Furn. Co. v. Crawford, 127 Mo. 356, 3o S. W.
163 (1895) ; Schwedtman v. Burns, ii S. W. (2d) 348 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
' Federal Advertising Corp. v. Hundertmark, i6o Atl. 40 (N. J. 1932) ; see United States
Smelting etc. Co. v. Wallapai Mining & Development Co., 27 Ariz. 126, 230 Pac. 11o9 (1924) ;
Belding v. Vaughan, io8 Ark. 69, 157 S. W. 400 (1913) ; Ennis Cotton-Oil Co. v. Burks, 39
S. W. 966 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897).
18o Wis. 635, 639, 5o N. W. 776, 777 (1891) ; see Hinkley v. Sagemiller, 191 Wis. 512,
21o N. W. 839 (1926).
' Kelner v. Baxter, L. R. 2 C. P. 174 (1866) ; In re Empress Engineering Co., 16 Ch. D.
125 (i88o) ; see Warren, The Progress of the Law: Corporations (921) 34 HARV. L. REv.
282, 29o. Compare Abbott v. Hapgood, I5O Mass. 248, 22 N. E. 9o7 (1889) and Holyoke En-
velope Co. v. United States Envelope Co., 182 Mass. 171, 65 N. E. 54 (19o2).
71n re Dale. & Plant, Ltd., 5 T. L. R. 585 (1889) ; Natal. Land Co. v. Pauline Colliery
Syndicate, [19o4] A. C. I2O.
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The majority of American jurisdictions allow the corporation to assume the
contract under various theories: ratification, s adoption,9 novation,10 acceptance
of a continuing offer,'1 or as a beneficiary under a contract between two
strangers.:2 The doctrine of ratification is manifestly inadequate under any
explanation which regards the promoter as an outsider. Ratification takes effect
in law from its being equivalent to previous authority, and this presupposes an
existing principal.'8 Consequently, the fiction of relation back has not generally
been invoked when the corporation has assumed a pre-organization contract. 4
An agency theory would seem powerless to explain a result reached in some
few jurisdictions whereby the promoter is held bound to the third party despite
adoption by the corporation.' 5 If the promoter were a true outsider we might,
in justification, contend that in a contract between A and B, C should not be
substituted for B without A's consent. B, in this case however, has really con-
tracted on C's behalf, and A intends to obtain C's legal obligation. To regard
all three parties as utter strangers is to ignore facts and distort intents. Although
this situation might be compatible with a theory of undisclosed principal,"0 the
promoter has been held in cases where the contract was clearly made on behalf
of the corporation.' Whether or not an undisclosed principal analogy has been
carelessly assimilated is not apparent. The rationale of judicial utterances such
as appears in Wallace v. Eclipse Pocahontas Coal Co.' is disturbingly obscure:
"As a general rule promoters of a corporation not yet organized,
especially when their contracts are nwde for and on behalf of the corpora-
'Stanton v. New York & E. Ry., 59 Conn. 272, 22 Atl. 3oo (x89o) ; see Oakes v. Cat-
taraugus Water Co., 143 N. Y. 430, 38 N. E. 46r (1894); Kaeppler v. Redfield Creamery
Co., 12 S. D. 483, 81 N. W. 9o7 (igoo).
'McArthur v. Times Printing Co., 48 Minn. 329, 51 N. W. 216 (1892) ; see Badger
Paper Co. v. Rose, 95 Wis. 145, 70 N. W. 302 (1897); Kirkup v Anaconda Amusement Co.,
59 Mont. 469, 197 Pac. OO5 (192) ; Schreyer v. Turner Flouring.Co., 29 Ore. 1, 43 Pac.
719 (1896). Where the corporation, knowing all the facts, accepts the benefits of a contract
it is bound thereby. Weatherford R. Co. v. Granger, 86 Tex. 350, 24 S. W. 795 (2894) ;
Rogers v. New York & Texas Land Co., 134 N. Y. 197, 32 N. E. 27 (1892); see Moore etc.
Hardware Co. v. Towers Hardware Co., 87 Ala. 206, 6 So. 41 (889).
" Professor Williston thinks that novation is the most accurate term. . it seems
more nearly to correspond with the intentions of the parties to suppose that when the cor-
poration assents to the contract, it assents to take the place of the promoter-a change of par-
ties to which the other side of the contract assented in advance. There would then be a
novation which would discharge the promoter at the same time the corporation assumed the
obligation." I WI=uSTON, CONTAcrs (2920) § 306.
' Hackbarth v. Wilson Lumber Co., 36 Idaho 628, 212 Pac. 969 (1923) ; see Deschamps
v. Loiselle, 50 Mont. 565, 148 Pac. 335 (I915) ; Wall v. Niagara Mining & Smelting Co., 2o
Utah 474, 59 Pac. 399 (1899) ; Pratt v. Oshkosh Match Co., 89 Wis. 4o6, 62 N. W. 84 (2895).
There are two difficulties with this theory: (I) to treat the promoter's contract as an
offer to the corporation is artificial; and (2) the conduct from which adoption is inferred
is not such as would ordinarily be regarded as communication of an acceptance of an offer.
MECHEM, AGmtc" (2d ed. 1914) § 383.
'See Villar & Co., Inc. v. Conde, 3o F. (2d) 588 (C. C. A. Ist, 1929) ; Kentucky To-
bacco Products Co. v. Lucas, 5 F. (2d) 723 (D. Ky. 1925).
' See Facke v. Scottish; Imperial Insurance Co., 34 Ch. D. 234, 250 (1886) ; I MORA-
WTZ, CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1886) § 549.
" Toledo & I. Traction Co. v. Toledo etc. R. Co., 171 Ind. 213, 86 N. E. 54 (19o8). But
see Stanton v. New York & E. Ry., supra note 8.
' EnRIcH, PRoatomrs (1916) 145. There are numerous citations in an annotation, many
of which, however, do not involve contracts where the promoter contracted expressly for the
corporation.
" MECHtEWm, op. cit. supra note 1i, § 1415.
'Mt. Pleasant Coal Co. v. Watts, 151 N. E. 7 (Ind. App. 1926); see Hilgemeier v.
Manufacturing Co., 81 Ind. App. 191, 139 N. E. 691 (1923); Kelner v. Baxter, supra note 6;
Ehrich and Bunzl, Pronwters' Contracts (0929) 38 YALE L. J. I0i, l104.
2883 W. Va. 321, 327, 98 S. E. 293, 295 (1929).
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tim, are regarded as the agents of the corporation, and such contracts be-
come binding upon them as well as upon the corporation after organization
and acceptance thereof by it." 19
This is neither sound agency doctrine nor substantial justice: it being usually
said that after the corporation adopts the contract the promoter has no cause of
action thereon.2 0  Moreover, even though those jurisdictions which follow the
dictum of the Wallace case conceded the promoter a cause of action, his dam-
ages would ordinarily be highly speculative, since the third party's contractual
duty is normally a performance running to the corporation.
21
Another result that is difficult to reconcile with an agency theory is the
refusal by the majority of courts to allow the promoter a recovery against the
corporation for services and expenses incurred in organization, unless made
liable by its articles of association.22  The theory is that as no corporation
actually existed at the time there can be no liability.23 Hence the promoter
again assumes the status of an outsider. This conclusion is reinforced by some
of those cases taking the opposite view, which go so far as to allow the promoter
his compensation despite fraud on his part.24 Under an agency or "fiduciary"
theory fraud should defeat the promoter's right to repayment entirely, since he
has failed in his duties.
2
,
Ehrich offers a further instance of the limitations of the agency theory.28
He is of the opinion that a New York statute 27 making it a misdemeanor for
an agent, employee, or servant to receive, without the knowledge of his principal,
a gift or gratuity in consideration of his acting in any particular manner in his
principal's business, probably does not apply to promoters of corporations.
Agency analogies are used in certain situations involving pre-incorporation
subscriptions. The weight of authority considers such transactions as constitut-
ing merely "continuing offers" to the incipient corporation. 28 When the latter
comes into existence it may accept or reject the "offer". 2 Notice of revocation
" Italics inserted.
' EmuCH, op. cit. supra note 15, at 132; see FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note I, § 217.
See dissenting opinion of Augustus Hand, J., in Eden et a[. v. Miller, 37 F. (2d) 8 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1930) ; Wiley v. Borough of Towanda, 26 Fed. 594 (W. D. Pa. i886).
'United German Silver Co. v. Bronson, 92 Conn. 266, o2 Ati. 647 (917) ; Weather-
ford R. Co. v. Granger, supra note 9; BALLANTINE, MAUAL OF CoapoRAiox LAW AND
PRAcTicE (1930) § 48. But see Van Zandt v. St. Louis etc. Groc. Co., ig6 Mo. App. 640, i9o
S. W. 1050 (917) ; Low v. Conn. etc. R. Co., 45 N. H. 370 (1864).
I See New York etc. R. Co. v. Ketchum, 27 Conn. 170 (1858) ; Rockford etc. R. Co.
v. Sage, 65 Ill. 328 (1872).
' The promoter was allowed a set-off for the fair value of his services in Mason v. Car-
rothers, 105 Me. 392, 74 Ati. o3o (i9o9) ; Hayward v. Leeson, 176 Mass. 310, 57 N. E. 656
(igoo); Emma Silver Mining Co. v. Grant, ii Ch. D. gi8 (1878); Lydney etc. Iron Co. v.
Bird, 33 Ch. D. 85 (1886).
I Davis v. Las Ovas Co., 227 U. S. 8o, 33 Sup. Ct. 9 (1913) ; Dunlap v. Twin City
Power Co., 226 Fed. i61 (C. C. A. 4th, igi5); Venie v. Harriet State Bank, 146 Minn. I42,
178 N. W. 170 (192o). Different considerations might arise if the promoter's fraud were a
technical one, and it appeared that he had acted in good faith throughout. See Richlands Oil
Co. v. Morriss, io8 Va. 288, 61 S. E. 762 (igog).
EHucH, op. cit. supra note 15, at 501, n. I.
N. Y. PENAL LAW (Supp. 1932) § 439.
SHudson Real Estate Co. v. Tower et a[., 156 Mass. 82, 3o N. E. 465 (1892) ; Muncy
Traction Engine Co. v. De La Green, 143 Pa. 269, 13 AtI. 747 (1888) ; see Starrett v. Rock-
land Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 65 Me. 374 (1876) ; Athol Music Hall v. Carey, 116 Mass. 471
(1875). The subscription may be so worded as to create a binding contract between the sub-
scribers, even in those states where the ordinary contract of subscription does not have that
effect. See Planters' & Merchants' Independent Packet Co. v. Webb, I56 Ala. 551, 46 So.
977 (1908) .
'Bryant's Pond Steam-Mill Co. v. Felt, 87 Me. 234, 32 AtI. 888 (1895); Auburn Bolt
& Nut Works v. Shultz, 143 Pa. 256, 22 Atl. 904 (i8gi); Hudson Real Estate Co. v. Tower,
supra note 28.
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communicated to the promoter is sufficient to release the recalcitrant subscriber.8 0
The promoter's status in this scene is a peculiar one. He cannot be the agent
of the corporation not yet formed so as to bind the subscriber to it; nor is he
regarded as the agent of the body of subscribers to bind them to each other.
Yet he is the agent of the corporation for the purpose of receiving notice of
revocation. What is commonly termed the Minnesota view looks upon pre-
incorporation subscriptions as contracts between the subscribers to take shares
of stock, on condition that the corporation accepts the subscription. The pro-
moter of the proposed corporation who solicits and obtains subscriptions is the
agent of the subscribers as a body. It is his duty to hold the subscriptions
until the corporation is formed in accordance with the terms and conditions of
the agreement, and then turn them over to it without any further act of delivery
on the part of the subscribers.31
In Hatcher-Powers Shoe Co. v. Kirk, 2 promoters sought subscriptions of
the defendants. The latter signed a subscription form leaving the number of
shares blank. The promoters filled in a greater number than the defendants
desired. The court reasoned that the defendants had constituted the promoters
their agents to fill in the blank. The defendants therefore were bound by their
agents' acts within the scope of their authority. The promoters, on the other
hand, were not the agents of the corporation, hence their knowledge could not
be imputed to the corporation 3 3 Compare this reasoning and terminology with
a portion of the opinion in Virginia Land Co. v. Haupt: 4
"A person fraudulently induced by an agent of a corporation-and a
promoter is an agent-to subscribe to its capital stock may, at his option,
repudiate the contract . ."
Without questioning the validity of the holding of either case, this contrast
furnishes an example of the limitations of the agency theory. That in a given
situation it may be desirable to attach to an individual some of the legal incidents
commonly attributed to agents and withhold others cannot be gainsaid. All the
legal incidents need not necessarily be present merely because we have one. A
man may be an agent for one purpose and not for another. So long as courts
consciously use a rationalization merely to justify a decision, there is small
danger of a miscarriage of justice through the media of analogies. An unwary
court, however, blindly applying the rationale of one of these cases to the other,
might, by undue generalization, fall into grievous error.
Probably the role in which the promoter is best known is that of "fiduciary".
Numerous, and at times sensational, trials to recover secret profits have informed
the public of the judicial pronouncement that the promoter is a "fiduciary" to
the corporation and its shareholders.3 5 He cannot profit at their expense without
a full disclosure. That the courts are groping for a legal explanation upon which
to ground this result is evident from this oft-quoted passage:
"This control of the promoter over the company, so plenary and
absolute involves a correlative responsibility, and out of this responsibility
I Bryant's Pond Steam-Mill Co. v. Felt, supra note 29; see Hudson Real Estate Co. v.
Tower, supra note 28.
"
' Minneapolis Threshing Machine Co. v. Davis, 4o Minn. IIo, 41 N. W. lO26 (1889).=233 Ky. 19, 24 S. W. (2d) 903 (1930).
' See Burt v. Batavia Paper Mfg. Co., 86 Ill. 66 (1877) ; EHRICH, op. cit. supra note 15,
§ 71; I THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1927) § 131.
9o Va. 533, 537, ig S. E. 168, 169 (1894).
See Dickerman v. Northern Trust Co., 176 U. S. I8I, 20 Sup. Ct. 311 (1899) ; The
Telegraph v. Loetscher, 127 Iowa 383, IOI N. W. 773 (19o4) ; Old Dominion Copper Mining
& Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159, 89 N. E. 193 (19o9); Pittsburg Mining Co, v.
Spooner, 74 Wis. 307, 42 N. W. 259 (1889); Erlanger v. New Sombrero Phosphate Co., 3
App. Cas. 1218 (Eng. 1878).
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arises the doctrine now well settled of the fiduciary relation of the promoter
toward the company he creates. This fiduciary relationship of the promoter
is an extension of the doctrine of agency, a sort of agency by anticipation,
for the promoter is not, strictly speaking, an agent of or a trustee for the
company before incorporation, but it is a salutary and necessary fiction of
equity for the protection of the company." 36
Another explanation for holding the promoter to a higher standard of honor in
selling securities than anyone else has been advanced. It has been suggested
that the promoter is for the time being the management of the association;
therefore a purchaser-a prospective shareholder-is entitled to the services of
the management in giving him a fair picture of the enterprise.3 7 At any rate,
courts have refused to extend the outsider theory used in situations dealing with
pre-incorporation contracts, so as to allow the promoter, under certain circum-
stances, to deal with the corporation at arm's length.
However, Densmore Oil Co. v. Densmore, et al.88 is frequently cited for
the proposition that the promoter, who acquires property before entering upon
his fiduciary duty, may sell it to the corporation at a profit, provided only there
be no fraudulent misrepresentations, and he makes known his interest in the
property.8 9 If the fiduciary theory is inflexibly applied, the time of acquiring
the property would appear to be immaterial so long as the promoter's fiduciary
relation did exist at the time of the sale to the corporation.4 0  The limitations
of the fiduciary theory are also recognized in Reynolds v. Title Guaranty Trust
Co.4 1 Although the court in that case conceded the existence of a fiduciary
relation between the promoter and the corporation, it was said that "it does not
follow that all moneys belonging to or procured by a promoter which may be
handled or dealt with by him during the promotion are impressed with a trust
in its [the corporation's] favor." 42 Thus the fiduciary analogy, as applied in
practice, has the advantages of forcing the promoter to disgorge profits which
the courts think unconscionable, and at the same time allowing the promoter to
reap some profits in return for his risk and expense.
4 3
The application of the fiduciary theory raises the problem of determining
when the promoter's fiduciary capacity begins. The numerous judicial attempts
to define the functions of a promoter and when a person becomes a promoter
reveal the difficulties inherent in this delicate question of fact. Bowen, L. J.,
once said that:
.. . promoter [is a term] usefully summing up in a single word a
number of business operations familiar to the commercial world by which
a company is generally brought into existence." 4
Generally the relation is said to begin when a person before the organization of
the corporation assumes to act in its behalf for the purpose of assisting in its
organization.48 In the carrying out of such transactions as he undertakes he is
Arnold et al. v. Searing et al., 78 N. J. Eq. 146, 157, 78 Atl. 762, 766 (igio).
' Bratz, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORArON FINANCE (1930) 615.
c64 Pa. 43 (1870).
See California-Calaveras Mining Co. v. Walls et al., 170 Cal. 285, 149 Pac. 595 (I915);
Victor Oil Co. v. Drum et al., 184 Cal. 226, 193 Pac. 293 (I92O) ; Henderson v. Plymouth
Oil Co., 15 Del. Ch. 231, 136 Atl. 140 (1926).
o See BALLANTINF, op. cit. supra note 22, at 173.
A 196 Mo. App. 21, i89 S. W. 33 (1916).
,Id. at 39, 189 S. W. at 38.
'Isaacs, The Protoier: A Legislative Probleinm (1925) .38 HARv. L. REV. 887, 894.
"'Bowen, L. J., in Whaley Bridge Calico Printing Co. v. Green, 5 Q. B. D. io9, IIl
(1879) T
"I T~onpsoir, op. cit. supra. note 33, § 96.
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regarded as a "fiduciary".4" It would seem that the technical objections that
have been raised against regarding the promoter as an agent for a non-existent
corporation would also obtain when he is said to be a "fiduciary" to the cor-
poration before it had any existence.4 7 Yet it is fully conceded that the fiduciary
relation of the promoter does arise before the corporation has acquired exist-
ence.
4 8
The relations of promoters inter se have usually been determined on the
principles of law governing partners or joint adventurers. 49  Promoters occupy
a fiduciary or trust relation to each other. 0 Anyone who obtains for himself a
secret advantage over his co-promoters may be compelled to account to them
therefor.5 A promoter who has been made to bear the entire obligation of a
contract is entitled to contribution from such of his fellow promoters as were
likewise responsible therefor.51 2  Yet, unlike partners, all promoters are not
jointly and severally liable for the expenses of an abortive attempt to organize
a corporation." Nor, it has been held, is a promoter liable for organization
expenses incurred before he became interested in the project.54 Thus, in this
group of relationships, the partnership analogy is limited; although the analogy
of joint adventurers seems, on the whole, fairly adequate.
In addition to- the broad analogies commonly adverted to, a promoter, in
any specific transaction, may find himself called a trustee. Where property was
conveyed to a promoter with the understanding that a proposed street railway
company would extend its line to a tract of land owned by the grantor, the
promoter was said to have taken the land as trustee for the company.5 5 Again,
where the plans of incorporation prove abortive, the courts, in order to permit
a recovery in equity, early spoke of the promoter as a trustee of the subscrip-
tion funds for the subscribers.5" Such decisions are perfectly consistent with
the law of trusts. However it is not uncommon to find decisions dealing with
secret profits in which "fiduciary" and "trustee" are used interchangeably.
5 7
Whether it is desirable to charge a promoter with any of the obligations of a
technical trustee depends upon the facts of the particular case. Pomeroy, in
discussing the promoter's relation toward persons whom he induces to subscribe
" EHRICH, op. cit. mtpra note 15, § 14.
"See the opinion of Lindley, L. J., in Lydney & Wigpool Iron Ore Co. v. Bird, supra
note 24, at 93.
" See cases cited supra notes 35 and 39.
" See I FrcHim, op. cit. supra note 1, at 602.
' See Cortes Co. v. Thannhauser, 45 Fed. 730, 739 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 18gi) ; William-
son v. Krohn, 66 Fed. 655 (C. C. A. 6th, 1895) ; De La Motte v. Northwestern Clearance
Co. et al., 126 Minn. 197, 148 N. W. 47 (94).
'Morris et al. v. Whittier Amusement Co., Io P. (2d) 1017 (Cal. 1932) ; Cassidy v.
Hornor, 86 Okla. 220, 2o8 Pac. 775 (1922) ; Modlin et al. v. Licht et at., 224 App. Div. 614,
231 N. Y. Supp. 265 (1928).
' Sandusky Coal Co. v. Walker et al., 27 Ont. L. R. 677 (1896) ; see Stainton v. Greeson,
178 Ark. I200, 12 S. W. (2d) 912 (1929); Boulter v. Peplow, 9 C. B. 493 (Eng. 1850).
"EHalCEE, op. cit. supra note 15, § 316.
' Beale v. Mouls, 1o A. & E. (N. s.) 976 (Eng. 1847). Cf. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIPS
Act § 17: A person admitted as a partner into an ekisting partnership is liable for all the
obligations of the partnership arising before his admission, as though he had been a partner
when such obligations were incurred, except that hig liability shall be satisfied only out o.f
partnership property.
Scott et al. v. Farmers' etc. Nat'l Bank et al., 97 Tex. 31, 75 S. W. 7 (903).
Williams v. Page, 24 Beav. 654 (Eng. 1858) ; Green v. Barrett, I Sim. 45 (Eng. 1826) ;
see Colt et al. v. Woolaston et al., 2 P. Wins. 154 (Eng. 5723).
' See Yeiser v. United States Board and Paper Co., 107 Fed. 340 (C. C. A. 6th, I9oi) ;
Downey et al. v. Byrd et al., 171 Ga. 532, 156 S. E. 259 (930) ; Pittsburg Mining Co. v.
Spooner, supra note 35.
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for shares of stock, carefully distinguishes it from the relationship of trustee
and cestui que trust. It is, he says, "based on a, conception of an existing quasi
trust relation, and of a breach of fiduciary duty growing out of such relations." 5s
The common law trustee, therefore, is an imperfect analogy. There is, more-
over, in considering such isolated transactions, no value to be derived from
generalizations. The obligations imposed are not the result of an individual's
capacity as promoter per se. They spring from the exigencies of a unique
factual situation. The rules governing the relations of promoters inter se are
not peculiar to promoters-they are applicable to any association of joint
adventurers. This field of the promoter's activity is probably better left un-
touched. An attempt to collate cases would provide no serviceable guide for
the future.
The adjudicated situations, then, reveal that there is no one analogy that
adequately covers all, or even a majority, of the business functions of the
promoter. The analogies that have been applied however, have, in the main,
served to explain commendable results. What danger, one may ask, lies in the
present state of the law? Will not a legislative codification be merely an
attempt to achieve verbal nicety? The result will have a more profound effect-
it will preserve existing legal principles without the sacrifice of substantial
justice5 9 Although the decisions are meritorious, their very merit has resulted
in a distortion of legal doctrine. This is particularly true in cases of adoption
by the corporation of pre-incorporation contracts. "Courts in interpreting and
enforcing these agreements have made a sincere attempt to effect justice, and,
at the same time, with rather disastrous results, to adapt contract law to the
unusual situations involved." 60 The result is that the status of promoters'
contracts is extremely uncertain. It is impossible, after examining cases in
which promoters' contracts have been adopted by the corporation, to arrive at
an underlying rule. The premises that the corporation must come into existence
unburdened, and that the promoter is an outsider are at the root of the difficulty.
Too, there is the danger of unduly extending an analogy, or of carrying
the wrong analogy into an unexplored situation. The decision in Old Dominion
Copper Co. v. Bigelow 61 has been severely criticized on the ground that the
fiduciary theory was carried to an unwarranted extreme.62 It has been con-
tended that the doctrine of that case makes the promoter a real trustee not for
the subscribers but for the corporation. The result was that the promoter was
compelled to repay a profit which had not only been consented to at the time it
was made, but now redounded to the benefit of shareholders who had never
sustained any damage. Those cases holding the promoter liable to the third
party after the corporation adopts the contract 6 3 would seem to be manifestly
unfair as well as violative of the real intent of the parties. Where the third
party knows that the promoter is contracting on behalf of the corporation his
undertaking is to keep his "offer open for acceptance by the corporation when
it is organized, and the promoter's intended obligation ordinarily is only to use
his best efforts to organize the corporation and to effect the acceptance of the
third party's offer by it." 6
M 3 PomroRY, EQuITY JURIPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § io96.
' See Richards, The Liability of Corporations on Contracts Made by Promoters (19o5)
"I9 HARv. L. REv. 97; Ehrich and Bunzl, supra note 17.
0 Ehrich and Bunzl, mpra note 17, at IOI2.
' Supra note 35. It is interesting to note that the Supreme, Court of the United States
reached a contrary result on the same set of facts. Old Dominion Co. v. Lewisohn, 210 U. S.
206,28 Sup. Ct. 634 (1908).
IWeston, Promoters' Liability: Old Dominion v. Bigelow (1916) 30 HARV. L. REv. 39;
see Note (19o9) 58 U. OF PA. L. REV. 226.
Supra notes 15 and 17.Ehrich and Bunzl, supya note 17, at 1O21.
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The realization that there is no common law niche for the promoter leaves
the solution of these problems to legislation. The promoter should have a place
in the general incorporation statutes of the several states. His duties to pre-
incorporation subscribers, his status in pre-incorporation contracts, his obliga-
tions to shareholders, present and future, should be set forth with considerable
detail. The desirable rules should be gleaned from decided cases without
mention of the analogies which have served as their vehicles in the past.65 It is
essential, in view of the fact that his status is sid generis, that the promoter be
treated as a "promoter" and nothing else. Heretofore motivating considerations
have been present only as inarticulate major premises; judicial opinions have
for the most part enunciated technical rules of law. There has always been
the danger of a false analogy; the uncertainty of the promoter's status in any
situation upon which there has been no square adjudication. Legislative recog-
nition of a problem born of legislation is the logical answer.
A.A.M.
For some broad suggestions as to the contents of such legislation see Isaacs, suprq note
43, at 900.
